ABSTRACT. We analyze patent licensing by a patent holder to downstream technology users. We study how the structure and level of royalties depends on the patent's strength, i.e., the probability it would be upheld in court. We examine the social value of determining patent validity before licensing, in terms of deadweight loss (ex post) and innovation incentives (ex ante). When downstream users do not compete against each other or the patent holder, license fees approximate the license fee for an ironclad patent times the patent strength, and reviewing validity before licensing would be unproductive (in expected value). But when downstream users compete, two-part tariffs for weak patents have high running royalty rates, combined with a negative fixed fee, and examining patent validity generates social benefits, both ex post and ex ante. Even without negative fixed fees, rival downstream firms will accept relatively high running royalties, so determining patent validity prior to licensing is socially beneficial.
Introduction
Economists traditionally view a patent as an ironclad property right: others cannot use the patented technology without a license. In reality, however, to stop another party from using the patented technology, a patent holder typically must go to court and prove the patent is both valid and infringed, and this is by no means always clear. A patent is thus not a clear right to exclude but rather a right to sue for infringement and, if successful, the right to be awarded damages for proven infringement and typically to obtain an injunction against future infringement.
Because patent rights are probabilistic, the economic impact of an issued patent depends upon patent strength, i.e., the probability θ that it would be found valid and infringed if tested in court. We study how patent impact varies with patent strength, a relationship that is fundamental to evaluating the operation and potential reform of the patent system.
Evidence has mounted in recent years that many issued patents are questionable or "weak," and might well be found invalid if vigorously litigated.
1 Some observers argue that weak patents constitute undeserved monopolies, and that we should reform the patent process to weed them out. Optimists respond that, if enforced at all, weak patents are licensed at commensurately low royalty rates, because licenses are negotiated in the shadow of infringement litigation.
Furthermore, as Mark Lemley (2001) stresses, it would be very costly for the PTO to scrutinize all patent applications as thoroughly as courts examine the relatively few litigated patents.
If a patent's validity will be tested in court before licensing, it has a market impact only if it turns out to be valid. Viewed at a date when it is still probabilistic, such a patent's expected impact, apart from litigation costs and effects during litigation, is thus proportional to its strength θ .
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In fact, however, far more patents are licensed, either without litigation at all or to settle litigation, than are litigated to a final judgment. 3 When a patent is licensed in the shadow of litigation, how does its strength affect the terms on which it is licensed? That is the central topic of this paper. We use a simple game-theoretic model of the licensing of a probabilistic patent:
the patent holder offers licenses to downstream firms, each of whom can accept the license, avoid using the patented technology, or infringe, prompting litigation. This naturally generalizes models of the licensing of ironclad patents, in which a downstream firm can either accept the offered license or avoid using the patented technology. 4 Our model assumes that litigation costs are zero, but nevertheless predicts licensing without litigation.
For patents licensed to downstream firms that do not compete against each other or against the patent holder, our model supports the optimistic perspective: weak patents generate little profits and little deadweight loss. But when downstream firms use the patented technology in competing against each other or against the patent holder, licensing interacts with that competition in two powerful ways. First, agreeing to per-unit royalties raises the joint profits of the patent holder and licensees by elevating the downstream price, moving it closer to the monopoly price. We show that this joint profit motive for high per-unit royalty rates prevails for weak patents if licenses can use unrestricted two-part tariffs. Second, a downstream firm's decision to litigate benefits other downstream firms as well as consumers, since the litigation may invalidate the patent. This force is dominant in the licensing of weak patents if the patent holder uses linear licenses or two-part tariffs with fixed fees that are restricted to be nonnegative. As a result of this positive externality, incentives to challenge patents are sub-optimal, and downstream firms will accept surprisingly large per-unit royalties.
We focus on ( ) r θ , the per-unit royalty rate at which a patent of strength θ will be licensed, because it governs licensees' marginal cost of using the patented technology and thus drives the deadweight loss associated with the patent. We show that the optimistic view requires that the per-unit royalty rate and the patent holder's profits are (roughly) proportional to patent strength, 3 Lemley (2001) estimates that about 5% of all patents are either licensed without litigation or are litigated., and that only 0.1% of all patents are litigated to trial, so roughly 50 times as many patents are licensed (without litigation or to settle litigation) as are litigated to trial. Kimberly Moore (2000) reports that the percentage of patent cases going to trial has declined over time, to 3.3% by 1999 (Table 1) . Jay Kesan and Gwendolyn Ball (2006) conclude that patent litigation is largely a settlement mechanism; about 10% of patent cases filed in 2000 led to rulings and verdicts (Table 6 ).
i.e., ( ) (1) r r θ θ ≈ and ( ) (1) P P θ θ ≈ , but we show that for weak patents licensed to downstream rivals ( ) r θ is a large multiple of (1) r θ and ( ) P θ is a large multiple of
This suggests that the benefit of more careful review at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) depends on competitive conditions among prospective licensees as well as on the patented technology. Such enhanced review can occur either before or after a patent issues; strengthening post-grant review of significant patents is a prominent part of patent reform proposals currently being considered in Congress. We confirm the role of competition, both ex post and ex ante.
Ex post, assume that the innovation has been made and that a patent of strength θ would be issued under normal review. How does further review affect the deadweight loss from the patent? For this analysis, θ need only be a commonly known probability; the relationship between patent strength and actual innovation does not matter. Unlike popular commentators, we do not assume that enhanced review would simply eliminate some "bad" patents without affecting others. Such a view is inconsistent with Bayesian statistics. Rather, given a set of patent applications, closer scrutiny brings out more information, inducing a mean-preserving spread on θ : what does not kill a patent makes it stronger. For example, starting with 0.4 θ = , further scrutiny might lead with 50% probability to a patent of strength 0.7 and with 50% probability to a patent of strength 0.1. In the extreme, "ideal" PTO review that replicates judicial review would lead either to an ironclad patent (with probability θ ) or to no patent (with probability 1 θ − ). The expected ex post benefit of such review is generalizes our results the case of a vertically integrated patent holder that competes against its licensees, and explores the effects of relaxing some of our assumptions. Section 8 concludes. 13 In the text, we assume this; the Appendix shows where we actually rely on this assumption.
Patent Licensing in the Shadow of Litigation

A. Technology and Licensing Game
C. Optimal Two-Part Tariffs
Suppose that 
denote the patent holder's resulting no-litigation payoff. That will be the overall equilibrium if P prefers it to litigating the patent. Litigating gives P zero if the patent is declared invalid and if it is upheld, for an expected payoff of (1) H
(1) H θ . Since P chooses between licensing and litigation, its payoff is ( ) max[ ( ),
: the patent owner can always get a fraction θ of the payoff from an ironclad patent by litigating.
Welfare Analysis of Probabilistic Patent Licenses
Before solving for the equilibrium two-part tariff in various settings, we develop welfare tools to evaluate the expected benefits of enhanced PTO review for patents that will be licensed rather than litigated. 16 Section 5 below shows that such licensing indeed arises in our model. Figure 2 displays a simplified game tree for licensing with ideal PTO review.
A. Ex Post Analysis
Given that the innovation has been made and a patent of strength θ issued, ex post welfare ( ) W θ is the sum of the patent holder's licensing revenues, the downstream firms' profits, and the surplus enjoyed by final consumers. If all N downstream firms accept licenses with running royalty r, ex post welfare depends only on r, since fixed fees are just transfers: ( )
14 Using the backstop technology would yield , which is less attractive than litigating.
15 A downstream firm might accept a running royalty rate combined with r v > 0 F < . However, under patent law a license can impose royalties only for use of the patented technology. We assume that this rule is effectively enforced. This implies , since even a downstream firm that signed a license would use the backstop technology rather than pay to use the patented technology. If the rule is not well enforced, P can bribe each downstream firm with a negative fixed fee to accept a royalty rate r (on all output) that supports the downstream monopoly price. In a previous version of this paper we showed that for sufficiently weak patents this is the equilibrium, and that for weak patents even if For larger innovations, µ may not be close to 1, but the Appendix shows that, for instance, 
B θ > for a wide range of patent sizes.
Theorem 1 casts the ex post analysis in terms of total welfare, but our model ignores litigation costs, which are borne by the patent holder and downstream firms. Given the PTO's review standards, those parties can choose whether or not the patent is litigated, but consumers cannot, so an externality-inspired approach would consider the effects of PTO review (or litigation) on consumers. With our assumption that ( ) p r is linear, the Appendix proves:
≥ then consumers benefit from ideal PTO review.
In the cases identified below where ( ) (1) r r θ θ > , the downstream firms have too little incentive to challenge a weak patent. 17 In such cases, consumers will value the right to trigger patent recourts in patent review: for instance, PTO review could be faster, reducing social costs borne in the interim before a patent validity ruling.
17 Jay Pil Choi (2002 Choi ( , 2005 argues that patent holders have weak incentives to challenge one another's patents if multiple weak patents are contributed to a patent pool. Our focus is instead on challenges by direct purchasers of the patented technology (downstream firms). Direct purchasers seem more likely to have legal standing, and although we are not aware of systematic evidence, we suspect that most patent licenses do not involve patent pools.
examination. 18 Theorems 1 and 2 apply regardless of the mechanism that determines ( ) r θ and , and do not depend on our specific licensing model. (1) r
B. Ex Ante Analysis
A firm's private incentive to engage in the R&D and patenting activities that lead to a patent of strength θ is ( ) P θ . How does this compare to the social contribution ( )
We assume that θ is the true probability that the patent holder contributed the patented technology to society. 19 Denoting by W the welfare that would result if the patented technology
were not available to society, ( )
The Appendix proves:
That is, if royalties exceed an intuitive benchmark, the patent holder's private return exceeds its social contribution. In expectation, the patent holder has inflicted a negative externality on others; marginally profitable activities leading to such patents lower expected welfare.
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Even if ( ) ( ) P K θ θ < , the relative incentives to pursue patents of different strengths may be biased. Consider a firm allocating its R&D and patenting budget between two activities. The first activity is a "conventional" line of research that, if it succeeds technically, will produce a useful but unsurprising technology, so there may already be prior art or a court may later deem the invention obvious. Thus, this activity generates patents of strength 1 θ < . A second, more creative line of research, if technically successful, will generate truly novel and non-obvious results, leading to ironclad patents. The firm will allocate its R&D budget based on the relative 18 The Electronic Frontier Foundation has a "patent-busting project" (www.eff.org/patent) that seeks to overturn some Internet and software-related patents by gathering prior art and requesting re-examination by the PTO. See Ian Austen, "Claiming a Threat to Innovation, Group Seeks to Overturn 10 Patents," New York Times, July 5, 2004 . Joseph Miller (2004 advocates rewarding firms that successfully invalidate patents.
19 Reiko Aoki and Jin-Li Hu (1999) analyze ex ante incentives of probabilistic patents, but focus entirely on the dilution (and other changes) of incentives for true innovation that will result only in a weak patent; James Anton and Dennis Yao (2003) have a similar focus. Their approach assumes that when a patent is held invalid or not infringed, it is a court (or legal system) error. Alan Marco (2006) attempts to estimate the frequency of such errors if financial markets always get it right. By contrast, we assume that when a patent is held invalid, it is because the court's thorough scrutiny shows that it truly did not represent a novel, useful, non-obvious contribution of the patent holder. 20 This can happen even with ironclad patents: in our linear Cournot example typically exceeds .
(1) P
(1) K reward to the two kinds of patents, ( )/ (1) P P θ . For social efficiency, the allocation should be based on the relative contributions, ( )/ (1) 
Theorem 4 links ex post and ex ante analysis: if there are ex post benefits of ideal PTO review, then there is also an ex ante bias toward seeking weak patents, which such review eliminates.
Downstream Firms That Do Not Compete
Suppose the downstream firms operate in separate markets, so each firm's profits do not depend 
With even moderate downstream competition, this will hold for quite substantial innovations. 22 This rent-shifting effect is recognized in the literature on the licensing of ironclad patents; see Sen and Tauman (forthcoming). Segal (1999) studies this effect much more generally. 23 Rent-shifting would be a big impediment to cartelizing an industry without a patent, because each downstream firm might hope to be (very profitably) the only one outside the cartel. Inadvertently, Blonder-Tongue ensures that if such an outsider successfully challenges a weak patent for its own use, it also disrupts the cartel. K θ < and eliminates a bias toward seeking weak patents,.
For Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and constant marginal costs, one can directly calculate
where A is the difference between the demand intercept and the production cost using the patented technology. 27 With 5 N = and 26 The Supplementary Materials associated with this paper fully work out all of these functions in this special case, which is often used in the oligopoly and licensing literature (e.g., Kamien (1992); Sen and Tauman (forthcoming)). 27 Alternatively, approximates the proportionate increase in first-best welfare from the innovation. (2003), Shapiro (2003) , and Robert Willig and John Bigelow (2004) . The patent holder may be able to disguise negative fixed fees (for example, it might transfer know-how to the licensee, or agree to a side deal). 
2( / )
v A / 0.1 v A = r v = , for 0.41 θ ≤ , ( ) 0 F θ < for 0.48 θ < , ( ) 0 K θ < for 0.18 θ < ,and( )/ ( ) 2 P K θ θ > for 0.48 θ ≤ .
Negative Fixed Fees Not Feasible
Variations and Extensions
A. Vertically Integrated Patent Holder
Our analysis extends easily to the case in which the patent holder is vertically integrated, 
B. Short-Term vs. Long-Term Licenses
We assumed above that a downstream firm's license remains in force if the patent is upheld after P litigates it with another downstream firm. Outside our model, licensees often make specific investments to use the patented technology, which provides an efficiency reason to design licenses that way. The Appendix shows that our results grow stronger if the patent holder can offer "short-term" licenses that do not survive a finding of validity. With unrestricted two-part tariffs, ( ) r v θ = for all θ , so the ex post welfare analysis is the same as it was above if
Ex ante, for all 1 θ < , ( ) P θ is higher than we derived above, and ( ) K θ is unchanged or lower, so the bias resulting from ( )/ ( ) (1)/ (1)
is stronger than above.
C. Linear Licenses
As Kamien (1992) noted, running royalties appear to be common. It is our impression that this is true (contrary to Theorem 5) even if licensees do not compete; the reasons are presumably outside our model, such as risk aversion, asymmetric information, and moral hazard. When licensees compete, the equilibrium running royalty is the much higher ( )
Theorem 8 for all θ , not just for 
. This can easily exceed unity, in which case ( ) 0
D. Enhanced Review of Patents
Short of "ideal" review, more realistic "enhanced" patent review (by the PTO or in litigation that settles before final judgment) uncovers some additional information about patent validity, inducing a mean-preserving spread on patent strength. Enhanced review thus increases 
E. Patent Validity and Patent Scope
We have cast our analysis so far in terms of uncertainty about patent validity. There is often also (or instead) uncertainty about whether a downstream firm's product actually infringes the patent. 35 The two kinds of uncertainty are equivalent if there is just one licensee. Our analysis extends to cases where patent scope or infringement rather than patent validity is the key issue, if a finding of (non-)infringement against one downstream firm implies that other downstream firms also are (not) infringing and that these firms can stop paying running royalties.
F. Litigation Costs and Bargaining
Litigation costs make licensing even more attractive relative to litigation than our model suggests. How do they affect the terms on which a probabilistic patent is licensed in the shadow of litigation? If, as above, P makes take-it-or-leave-it offers, of course, it can demand more; if downstream firms had commitment power, they could offer less. Extending the model to include litigation costs would thus seem most natural if we also extended it to more general bargaining, which becomes complex when competing downstream firms bargain with P. 
G. Litigation Credibility
As we noted above, if firms sign lucrative licenses and one infringes, the patent holder might be reluctant to litigate and put its licensing revenues at risk. Jay Pil Choi (1998) what a license can do in this respect, but licenses may be able to bundle trade secrets (or other patents) with a weak patent. However, the more effectively the license ensures that running royalties continue even if another downstream firm successfully challenges, the greater is the upside to a challenge, and the less the patent holder can exploit relativity. These issues will be a fertile area for future work.
Conclusion
In fiscal 2006, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office received 444,000 patent applications and issued 183,000 patents; in the past ten years, it has issued 1.7 million patents. 37 Evidence has 36 Farrell and Robert Merges (2004) explore the role of relativity in determining parties' effort (expenditure) in patent litigation, noting that this makes both litigation costs and the resulting probability θ endogenous.
mounted that many patents would likely not hold up if tested in court, not surprisingly since on average a patent examiner reportedly spends only about 15-20 hours on a patent application. is convex in t. This proves that consumers are risk loving in the royalty rate (a fact useful beyond this Theorem), so they benefit from mean-preserving spreads in r. Since they also prefer lower royalty rates, they welcome ideal PTO review, which is a combination of a mean preserving spread and a possible reduction in the expected royalty rate when ( ) Without the patent holder's activities, with probability θ the patented technology would be unavailable, which for consumers is the same as there being a royalty rate of v. With probability 1 θ − the patented technology would be available without royalties. The proof of Theorem 2 showed that consumers are weakly risk-loving in the royalty rate. Since they also prefer lower royalties, if ( ) r v θ θ ≥ , they are harmed by the patent holder's activities, and strictly so if r v θ > .
Since the patent holder's activities harm both downstream firms and consumers, the patent holder's profits must exceed its social contribution; the proof shows that if contribution if the patent is not examined more carefully, and ( ) B θ is the additional benefit arising from ideal PTO review, their sum is the patent holder's expected contribution under ideal PTO review, which is precisely the contribution from an ironclad patent times the probability that the patent will indeed be found valid under ideal PTO review.
Since (1 In a symmetric equilibrium, we also have '( ) ''( ) / 1 ''( ) / '( ) '( )
